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RECONNAISSANCE REPORT OF THE MAY 28, 2009 




Missouri University of Science and Technology 
Department of Civil, Environmental and Architectural Engineering 
130 Butler-Carlton Hall 
1401 N. Pine St. 




A team sponsored by the Earthquake Engineering Research Institute (EERI) and the Geoengineering Extreme Event 
Reconnaissance (GEER) Association carried out a field investigation in conjunction with Honduran colleagues from June 18-23 
to document effects of the May 28 earthquake. The EERI-GEER team was invited by Mr. Marco Sandoval, Executive Director of 
the Comisión Ejecutiva Valle de Sula (CEVS). Mr. Sandoval sent a team of engineers to accompany the EERI-GEER team. The 
team included experts in structural, geotechnical engineering, as well as in disaster response and recovery. The investigators 
were supported by EERI: Abdeldjelil Belarbi and GEER: Ronaldo Luna and Kermit Applegate, all from Missouri S&T, Rolla. 
The CEVS team consisted of Humberto Calderon, Osvaldo Rivera, and Luis Alonso Lopez. Observations of other individuals 
who visited the earthquake-affected region have also been incorporated in this report. This material is based upon work 
supported by the National Science Foundation through the GeoEnvironmental Engineering and GeoHazards Mitigation 
Program under Grant No. CMMI-0825734.  Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this 
material are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the NSF.  The GEER Association is made possible by 
the vision and support of the NSF Geoenvironmental Engineering and GeoHazards Mitigation Program Directors: Dr. Richard 
Fragaszy and the late Dr. Cliff Astill.  GEER members also donate their time, talent, and resources to collect time-sensitive field 
observations of the effects of earthquakes. The EERI efforts were supported through the Learning From Earthquakes (LFE) 





An earthquake of magnitude M 7.3 struck the Atlantic coast of Honduras on May 28, 2009.  The epicenter was located 63 km 
north of Roatán (Bahía Islands) and 125 km NNE of La Ceiba.  This has been the strongest earthquake felt in Honduras in the 
past 3 decades.  The earthquake event and aftershocks were felt in Honduras, Belize, Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala.  
Several smaller events followed the main event, such as the June 8th and 15th events with magnitudes 5.4 and 4.8, respectively.  
The earthquake event was of significant magnitude and with limited consequences.  At least 7 people were killed and 40 injured 
with damage to more than 150 buildings.  Some of the country’s major infrastructure, such as port terminals, bridges and levees 
were seriously damaged.  The following sections address the seismological setting, geotechnical and structural aspects and the 
socio-economic impact.  Several GoogleEarth .kmz files complement this report, which contain GPS tracks, waypoints, and 
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TECTONIC SETTING AND SEISMOLOGICAL 
RECORDS 
 
According to the USGS interpretation of the seismological 
data the location and focal mechanism of the Honduras 
earthquake of May 28, 2009, imply that the shock occurred 
as the result of left-lateral strike-slip faulting.  This event 
was located on the Swan Islands Transform Fault, a 
segment of the boundary between the North America and 
Caribbean plates.  It has been estimated that in this region 
the plate boundary has a 20 mm/yr slip.  (USGS, 2009) 
 
The North America/Caribbean plate boundary has 
generated strong earthquakes before, thirty three years ago 
the 1976 Guatemala earthquake, M 7.5, produced more 
than 23,000 fatalities.  The 1976 earthquake occurred on 
the Motagua fault, a segment of the plate boundary that lies 





Figure 1 – Tectonic Setting (USGS, 2009) 
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Figure 2 – Epicentral Region (USGS, 2009) 
 
 
The seismological records in Honduras are scarce.  A 
recent station was installed by the USGS in Tegucigalpa, 
the capital city.  The record from this station is more than 
310 km away from the epicenter.  Another seismograph 
has been in operation for some time now at the El Cajon 
dam site about 260 km away from the epicenter.  Both 
seismograph instruments recorded data and preliminary 
review indicates low quality records.  The few stations that 
have been installed are monitored and supported by the 
INETER from Nicaragua.  Additionally, three 
accelerographs are also installed at the dam at the base and 
other two within the concrete structure, the records were 





Local Site Effects 
 
The seismic event produced strong ground motion 
throughout the region, but its effects were amplified 
primarily within the alluvium valley of the Ulua and 
Chamalecon Rivers.  Damage was selective of those 
structures that were supported on soft foundation soils 
and/or supported on filled or reclaimed land.  This was 
evident at sites located in San Pedro Sula and Puerto 
Cortés.  The most obvious example of local site effects was 
at the Supreme Court Building located on the Segunda 
Circunvalación Road in San Pedro Sula.  The Supreme 
Court building is a three story reinforced concrete frame 
which underwent structural damage (see Figure 11).  The 
building is supported on about 3 m of fill underlain by soft 
and compressible organic soils.  In contrast to this 
structure, a multi-story reinforced concrete stadium located 






Liquefaction was widespread in areas underlined by 
granular saturated sediments.  Sand boils, surface cracks, 
and lateral spreads were evident in many areas near Puerto 
Cortes and towards the town of Omoa on the Caribbean 
Sea coast.  The structures impacted by the widespread 
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liquefaction were petrochemical terminals, ports, wharfs, 
roadway embankments and other smaller buildings.   
 
Of particular interest was the damage encountered at the 
Chevron Terminal in Puerto Cortés.  This area was built on 
sandy fill.  Liquefaction sand boils were wide spread 
throughout the terminal within tanks, pipe racks and small 
buildings (see Figure 3).  Damage to tanks was not evident, 
except a pressurized vessel that settled more than 2 ft on 
one side tilting the entire tank, which was supported on 
shallow foundations (see Figure 4).  Small structures 
supported on shallow foundations were damaged, such as 
the laboratory and office buildings (see Figure 5).  Safety 
inspection requirements and repairs of tanks and pipeline 
systems will take more time. 
 
  
Figure 3 – Chevron Terminal remains closed as of 06/28/2009.  
(a) Note inundation due to wide spread liquefaction [05/28/2009 N15.848287, W87.958041],  
(b) Same entrance location 3-weeks later [06/20/2009 12:40PM, N15.848287, W87.958041], and  




Figure 4 – (a) Tanks supported on shallow foundations sank and tilted, notice sand boil piled up next to foundation on left 




                                                
Figure 5 – (a) Buildings and small structures sank up to 3 ft and were flooded with liquefied sand [06/20/2009, 1:08 PM, 
N15.849851, W87.95793], and (b) vehicles sank into sand boils, see carport automobile was already extracted [06/20/2009, 1:25 
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Other buildings and residences were damaged in the 
central zone of Puerto Cortés due to the wide spread 
liquefaction and ejected sand.  Buildings tilted and became 
inundated, leaving much sand behind.  The surface storm 
sewer system was clogged for weeks until the municipality 
and neighbors were able to excavate the drains.  A recently 
build roadway embankment that contains a major utility on 




        
Figure 6 – Temporary repair of roadway embankment, due to lateral spreading  




Earthquake damage at the most important port in Honduras 
was localized even though it remains in operation.  Most of the 
damage was concerning movement of slabs and wharfs causing 
joints to move in the vertical and horizontal directions.  In 
some cases the slabs collapsed due to the loss of subgrade 
support (Fig 7a and 7b).  It was reported that some of the pile 
supported wharfs moved upwards by several inches.  Some 
foundations appeared to have moved upward, but this 
differential movement is all relative to the surrounding ground 
subsidence, which needs to be confirmed by precision survey 
(Fig. 7c).  Fuel tanks supported on concrete mats experienced 
large deformations due to widespread liquefaction and surface 
rupture of fill materials, see Figure 7(d). 
 
 
             
 (a) Up to 0.46m at the main dock [06/20/2009, 3:37PM, N15.843718, W87.951739],  
(b) 0.2m near port warehouses [06/20/2009, 3:49PM, N15.8424, W87.94941], and  
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(d) Three view of fuel tanks and multiple ground fissures due to wide spread liquefaction 
[06/20/2009, 3:12PM, N15.846936, W87.963225] 
 




The valley of the Ulúa and Chamalecón rivers (Valle de 
Sula), runs north towards the Caribbean Sea. A system of 
levees protects the agricultural activities, urban and 
residential areas.  A preliminary survey completed by the 
Comisión Ejecutiva Valle de Sula (CEVS) identified 58 
km of levee damage due to the earthquake event.  Lateral 
spreading was observed along the banks of the Ulúa River.  
On the edge of a sugar cane plantation, about 250 meters 
from the river edge, long fissures opened in the direction 
parallel to the river (Figure 8).  The crack openings ranged 
from 10 to 50cm with a depth of about one meter.  
Allochthonous sand ejecta ware present along the length of 
the fissures, and sand boils were scattered amongst the 
sugar cane plantations. 
 
 
         
Figure 8 – (a) Longitudinal cracks along roadways [06/22/2009, 10:03AM, N15.368726, W87.861301], (b) with sand at surface 
[06/22/2009, 10:10AM, N15.369316, W87.860965],  
(c) sandboils within plantations [06/22/2009, 10:06AM, N15.368988, W87.861209]. 
 
Near the edge of the Ulua River, on the unprotected zone 
of the levee system, extreme lateral spreading was evident.  
Gaping fissures up to 5 meters wide and two meters deep 
have indelibly altered the landscape (Figure 9).  This will 
have serious consequences as the rainy season approaches 
and the levee system is not able to keep the flood water out 
of the protected zones (plantations and rural residences). 
(b) (c)(a) 
(d) 
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Figure 9 – Multiple views of severe lateral spreading between levees and river 
[06/22/2009, 10:25AM, N15.391266, W87.845191]. 
 
Along the crest of the levee system, a network of smaller 
cracks (about 5-10cm wide and several meters deep) has 
rendered nearly 60 km of the levee system ineffective 
(Figure 10).  CEVS is currently undergoing an emergency 




Figure 10 – Cracks at the crest of levees exceeding 1.5m deep 







The Supreme Court building, located on the Segunda 
Circunvalación Road in San Pedro Sula, is a three story 
reinforced concrete frame which underwent structural 
damage.  Each story is about 4 m high with columns and 
beams with the same (350 mm x 350 mm) cross-section.  
The building had frames with concrete beams running in 
orthogonal directions. The concrete frames were in-filled 
with brick masonry. Typical failures of these in-filled 
masonry walls are shown in Figure 11.    
 
Inside the building and some locations, these frames were 
partially filled with masonry walls. This in turn causes the 
reduction in height of the column resulting in increased 
lateral shear during earthquakes. This is also called as short 
column effect. This failure mode, also called captive-
column or captured-column, is very common in RC frames 
with infill walls. This failure happens when an infill wall is 
extended into a frame from the floor level up to another 
level to form a window, leaving a short free space in the 
top portion. The column in such a structure is partially 
restricted by the wall. This shortened column develops 
large shear force which may exceed the shear capacity of 
the column, resulting in failure. The problem is well 
known but is often ignored in practice. In some cases, the 
infill walls are separated from the column to allow flexure 
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of columns. But insufficient gaps produced the same 
consequences. Figure 11b shows a reinforced column 
failed by shear. The column is constrained by masonry 
infill walls in perpendicular direction. Shear cracks were 
developed from masonry wall which led to shear failure of 
columns. Figure 11c shows the failure due to short column 
effect from a masonry infill wall. These columns had No. 3 
ties spaced at 6 to 8 inches.  This seems to be an 
inadequate detailing for seismic loading. The large spacing 
of lateral ties did not provide the required confinement to 
the core concrete.  
  
Infill walls, usually located between RC columns and 
beams, can suffer out-of-plane overturn due to inertial 
forces during an earthquake. Because infill walls are non-
load-bearing elements, they tend to be thin and cannot rely 
on the additional shear strength that accompanies vertical 
compressive loads. If infill walls are not properly 
restrained in out-of-plane direction, walls can collapse 
during strong ground shaking, producing damages to 
inhabitants and properties. If walls on the façade of a 
structure collapse, the consequences could be deadly to 
pedestrians. Figure 11a shows a typical in-fill wall failure. 
          
(a) Overall damage including out-of-plane failure of masonry infill wall  
[06/19/2009, 5:53PM, N15.472899, W88.018565]. 
 
     
(b) Column failure at the infill wall frame interface  (c) short column effect failure 
[06/19/2009, 5:08PM, N15.473038, W88.018103]  [06/19/2009, 5:31PM, N15.473346, W88.018592] 
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Bridges 
 
Two bridges suffered serious consequences by the seismic 
events of May 28th, 2009.  The reinforced concrete 3-arch 
bridge, entitled “La Democracia”, crosses the Ulua River 
near the town of El Progreso.  The bridge connects this 
town to the major city of San Pedro Sula in northern 
Honduras.  The bridge that experience collapse of the 
middle span was built in 1965 by a team of French 
engineers.  The structure consists of two middle supports 
with nearly symmetric monolithic arches, with the middle 
span complemented by a straight beam span.  The total 
length of the bridge was 258 m. The middle span was 36 
m. These middle components consist of four simply 
supported T-beams.  All supports, including abutments, 
consist of steel plate bearings.  Figure 12 shows the 
collapsed middle span and in the background the newer 
2005 twin bridge built by the Japanese, which still is in 
service taking the traffic towards el Progreso.  The 
bearings on the abutments moved more than 250 mm in the 
horizontal direction. This bridge had shear key only in the 
longitudinal direction to support the T-beams. This simply 
supported girder Type Bridge had inadequate seating and 
no provisions like lateral restraint to prevent unseating. 
The lack of redundancy in the simply supported beam also 
prevented formation of alternate load path which resulted 




Figure 12 – La Democracia twin-bridge with middle span collapsed.  
(a) Top view of shear key [06/19/2009, 6:45PM, N15.404139, W87.820174.],  
(b) Overall view of the twin bridge [06/19/2009, 6:45PM, N15.40478, W87.819967], and  
(c) cracking due to lateral restraint in the new bridge [06/19/2009, 6:58PM, N15.40408, W87.820615]. 
 
 
In contrast, the new bridge, which consists of a single 
monolithic concrete arched structure, has neoprene 
elastomeric bearings and shear keys at the supports.  The 
shear keys suffered diagonal cracks, evidence that they 
engaged in keeping the bridge on its bearings during the 
seismic event.  A transverse crack on the bridge (western 
bank) was identified.  Liquefaction sand boils and 
significant settlement of the banks and possible lateral 
spreading was evident on the river banks.  In some 
locations cracks and settlement exceeding 250 mm was 
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Figure 13 – Settlement of ground around abutments due to liquefaction  
(a) Old bridge westbound [06/19/2009, 6:36PM, N15.404409, W87.821095], and  




The other bridge that suffered damage during the seismic 
event was the bridge near Santa Rita over the Humuya 
River (Figure 14).  The foundation support was already 
weakened due to scour, which historically has damaged the 
bridge and scour continues to aggravate the situation.  The 
most common cause of bridge failure is structural 
instability and undermining caused by movement of 
column bent exaggerated by excessive scouring. Scour is 
the result of the erosive action of flowing water, excavating 
and carrying away material from the bed and banks of 
streams, and from around the piers and abutments of 
bridges. 
This two-lane bridge consists of 8 spans of 5 simply 
supported reinforced concrete girders (1m x 0.6m x 30m) 
built in the 1970s.  Two supports experienced significant 
movement and the third column bent was tilted and rotated 
causing settlement and a reduction in the bearing support 
of the girders   The fourth span had only about 5 to 6 cm of 
bearing on the third column bent as shown in Figure 14.  
The night of June 28th several spans collapsed as shown in 
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Figure 14 – Santa Rita Bridge over the Humuya River after the earthquake and before collapse 
(a) [06/21/2009, 6:08PM, N15.191548, W87.82559], 
(b) [06/21/2009, 5:43PM, N15.191017, W87.8922393], 





      
Figure 15 – Collapse of the 2 to 3 spans of the Sta. Rita Bridge over the Humuya River post-earthquake 
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El Cajon Dam 
 
A visit by the recon team was made on June 21st consisting in 
meeting with the director of dam safety at the dam site and 
external and internal visit of this concrete arch dam.  The 
dam is 227 m high arched dam and it forms a reservoir 
94km2.  This dam is the most significant civil infrastructure 
in northern Honduras and continued normal operations 
during and after the event.  However, the response of the dam 
to the earthquake was successfully recorded by the 
instrumentation monitoring system at the site, including one 
seismograph and three accelerographs.  After the event a 
visual inspection was made by the safety inspection squad 
and was followed by a more detailed data collection survey 
of the installed instrumentation.  The following is a summary 
of the measurements and observations made immediately 
after the earthquake event. 
Accelerographs: Historic values were reached during the 
event.  At the top of the dam (El. 291m) the Dam registered 
its maximum value of -0.081g was recorded.  At the bottom 
of the dam (El. 78m) the maximum acceleration was 
recorded as 0.010g.  The maximum value obtained before 
this event was of -0.045g on July 11, 1999. 
Seismograph:  During the following 13 hours after the main 
event, 23 events were registered in the seismograph, which is 
located on rock below the safety engineering station on the 
west abutment.  The seismograph data was delivered to 
INETER in Nicaragua for interpretation. 
Pendulums:  There are 21 pendulums which measure the 
deformation of the dam. The readings of these instruments 
are not outside the normal parameters because there was not 
a deformation in the dam.  Evidently, during the event the 
alarm went off because the dam moved. 
Extensometers: These instruments measure the deformation 
of the rock in the base of the dam. The readings from these 
devices are between the same parameters as before the event, 
so there is no value outside the boundaries. 
Filtration Flow and Drainage: The increments in the flow 
are not significant.  The change in flow after the event was 
noteworthy, from about 138 lt./sec. to  167 lt./sec.  Turbidity 
was detected in the downstream outflows shortly after the 
event (3 days), but none was observed during our visit.  This 
is evidence of adjustments within the rock and soil that may 
promote continued filtration through the curtain.  
 
     
Figure 16 – (a) Weir passing turbid water at base of dam [05/28/2009, N15.03096, W87.747885], and  
(b) reflected in downstream river [05/28/2009, N15.03096, W87.747885]. 
 
 
Pore pressures: In general the behavior of the impermeable 
curtain was not significantly impacted.  However, four 
piezometric instruments in the G78 gallery present 
increments equivalent to about 16 to 19 m of pressure head.  
This coincides with the location of the “Fault III” within the 
dam site, suggesting movement during the event. 
 
(a)  (b)
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Figure 17 – (a) Turbid seepage at base of dam [05/28/2009, N15.03096, W87.747885], and 
(b) clear seepage at base of dam [06/21/2009, 11.55AM, 15.03096, -87.747885] 
 
 
Powerhouse: There are no seepage increments in the 
filtration paths of the north well and GL11 spring (old 
access), but the water is showed high turbidity.  At a joint of 
the access tunnel I17 similar situation was observed with 
higher temperatures reaching 34.6C.   
 
Even though the dam safety instrumentation measured the 
impact of the earthquake event on the dam, the structure is 
considered safe and continues to operate normally.  The dam 
safety plan did not require any further action, as none of the 
thresholds were reached.  However, a grouting plan 
programmed for the near future to seal the existing grout 




Several major civil infrastructures in the north of Honduras 
along the Valle de Sula (Petrochemical Terminals, Bridges, 
and Levees) were crippled by the earthquake events of May 
28th, 2009 and will have a lasting impact on the socio-
economic recovery.  The Chevron Terminal at Puerto Cortés 
has been closed for more than a month due to safety 
concerns, most tanks have been emptied and gasoline 
distributed on trucks.  This terminal supplies about 40% of 
the gasoline to the country and in some service stations 
gasoline is becoming scarce.  The 60km of damage levees 
due to large longitudinal cracks and lateral spreading are 
currently being repaired by the CEVS corps of engineers.  
However, these weakened earth structures will remain 
vulnerable to flood events during hurricane season which 
starts in September.  Other building damage, primarily 
residential and small commercial, was also observed 
throughout the region and was not the focus of this 
investigation.  The officials at the local municipality in 
Puerto Cortés, in conjunction with COPECO, conducted a 
detailed damage assessment survey and identified more than 
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